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COUNTERCLAIMS AND SET-OFFS IN
INDIANA
HAROLD W. STARR*
In dealing with the subjects of set-off and counterclaim it
must be borne in mind that these procedural devices are created
by our civil code and are not limited or defined by common law
decisions. It will be evident, however, from an examination of
the cases, that the influence of pre-statutory determinations has
played some part in the construction placed on the provisions set
forth by our codifiers. One of the important purposes of the
adoption of the code system of pleadings was to enable the par-
ties to determine their differences in one action.' To this end,
the following statutes were made a part of the Indiana Civil
Code:
The defendant may set forth in his answer as many grounds
of defense, counterclaim, and set-off, whether legal or equitable,
as he shall have.2
A set-off shall be allowed only in actions for money-demands
upon contracts, and must consist of matter arising out of debt,
duty or contract, liquidated or not, held by the defendant at the
time the suit was commenced, and matured at or before the time
it is offered as a set-off.3
Both the need and the desirability of some such procedure
was recognized at the common law and in the early chancery
practice, but the means used were of a somewhat different na-
* Of the Monroe County Bar.
124 Ruling Case Law Set-Off and Counterclaim, p. 9, and cases cited
therein.
2 Burns' R. S. (1926), Sec. 370, subsec. 3.
3 Burns' R. S. (1926), Sec. 371.
4 Burns' R. S. (1926), Sec. 373.
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ture. At common law, a defendant was sued on a contractual
obligation either because he had not complied with some cross-
obligation of the contract on which he was suing, or because he
had violated some duty which the law imposed on him in the
making or performing of that contract.5 This right was known
as recoupment, a term of French origin which signifies cutting
against or cutting back.6 By use of this device the defendant
might reduce the plaintiff's claim for damages in instances where
the reduction claimed sprang immediately from the claim relied
on by the plaintiff. It was used as a matter of defense only and
was never used as an offensive weapon when employed in a court
of law.7 This remedy of recoupment was so limited in scope and
so trammeled originally by technicalities that it was of little use.
The principle, however, has been retained and the tendency of
modern American courts has been to give recoupment a wider
and more extended application.8 Although the proposition is not
without dispute it seems logical that the statutory provisions for
counterclaim and set-off do not expressly or impliedly abolish
the common-law defense of recoupment.9 The whole spirit and
plan of the codes was to liberalize the procedure, and to extend,
instead of curtailing, remedial practices. 0 Recoupment in the
code states is important as a defense when it would be unavail-
ing as an affirmative cause of action because of the running of
the statute of limitations."
The common law did not countenance the possibility of a de-
fendant being an actor and interposing a claim against the plain-
tiff in one action. The courts of equity however realized that in
order to promote justice the defendant might and should be al-
lowed to assert a claim which he held against the plaintiff when
the two parties were mutually indebted.' 2 This was accom-
5 Ruling Case Law, Set-Off and Counterclaim, Vol. 24, Par. 3.
6 Peuser v. Marsh (1915), 167 App. Div. 604, 153 N. Y. S. 381.
7 Sterling Products Co. v. Watkins-Gray Lumber Co. (1923), 131 Miss.
145, 95 So. 313; Kegan v. Park Bank (1927), 20 Mo. 623, 8 S. W. (2d) 858.
8 Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Jameston (1878), 13 W. Va. 833; see also 40
Am. Dec. 320, note.
9 Clark v. Wildridge (1854), 5 Ind. 176; Houston v. Young (1855), 7
Ind. 200.
10 24 Ruling Case Law, Set-Off and Counterclaim, Par. 6.
"State v. Arkansas Brick Co. (1911), 98 Ark. 125, 135 S. W. 843;
Burns' R. S. (1926), Sec. 391.
12 Yardley v. Clothier (1892), 51 Fed. 506; Vermont State Bank v. Por-
ter (1812), 5 Day (Conn.) 316, 5 Am. Dec. 157.
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plished by the cross-bill in equity which closely corresponds to
the statutory counterclaim, though the latter is more compre-
hensive.13
The Indiana courts have indulged in a great deal of confusing
language in efforts to determine what parts of these pre-statu-
tory provisions are embodied in the code sections of set-off and
counterclaim. The Supreme and Appellate tribunals of this state
have said that: "The counterclaim is the equivalent of the cross-
bill in chancery, and in addition includes common-law recoup-
ment;"'34 "a counterclaim is the same thing as a recoupment at
common law ;"15 "the counterclaim rests on the same footing as
the cross bill in equity";1 and "counterclaim relates more to
damages for contract breach which may be recouped for part
performance ... ."17 It is submitted that these phrases are in
no way helpful to a clear understanding of the statutory provi-
sions and, in addition to causing needless confusion, are for the
most part erroneous. The counterclaim is a device created by
the code and although it serves a purpose which occasioned the
innovation of recoupment it is in no other respect necessarily
analogous to the common law defense. The determination of the
requirements and availability of the counterclaim and set-off
should be limited to a construction of the terms and words used
in the statutes and no additional support is necessary
The Code has separately defined a set-off and a counterclaim
and there is neither express nor implied mention in either stat-
ute that one is related to the other. On the contrary, it is evident
that the codifiers intended that they remain distinct and apart
from each other, since they are limited to separate and alto-
gether different fields. Despite this fact, one of the most per-
plexing problems confronting a reviewer of the cases is to
determine whether the court is discussing a pleading as to coun-
terclaim or as a set-off. The courts have had a tendency to use
the terms synonymously. The desirable and correct attitude
towards the using of these terms interchangeably was displayed
by the court in an early case wherein it was said in substance:
Our statutes distinctly define set-off and counterclaim and the two
differ materially. A set-off being a separate indebtedness could not be had
13 Note, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 119.
14 Duffy v. England (1911), 176 Ind. 575; Shipman Mfg. Co. v. Pfeiffer
(1894), 11 Ind. App. 445.
15 Slayback v. Jones (1857), 9 Ind. 470.
'6 Douthitt v. Smith, Admr. (1880), 69 Ind. 463.
17 Slayback v. Jones (1857), 9 Ind. 470.
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in view in the transaction out of which the cause of action may have arisen
and is not therefore within the definition of a counterclaim. The two terms
are not synonymous nor is one included in the other.'8
It is unnecessary therefore for the purpose of this article to
compare the two methods but each should be considered sepa-




The purpose of the counterclaim is to avoid unnecessary liti-
gation and to prevent circuity or municipality of suits. In con-
struing its birth-giving statute, the furtherance of that purpose,
within its limits as bounded by the language of the statute,
should at all times be the paramount aim of the courts. It is sur-
prising to note that in some of the cases the court has made no
effort to interpret the statute nor to rely upon a previous inter-
pretation, but has in fact disregarded the legislative provisions
altogether. 19 An early case supported a counterclaim by the fol-
lowing language: "We cannot conceive of a better counterclaim
nor one better pleaded." 20 There was no reference to the statute
nor any additional reasons cited by the court. Our statute on the
counterclaim is one of definition rather than direction. The in-
ference obviously is that if the pleading comes within the defini-
tion it is available as a counterclaim. It follows therefore that
the method to be followed by all courts in the determination of
the validity of a pleading as a counterclaim should be whether or
not the pleading comes within the statutory definition. A fair
construction of the language used in the Code is the inevitable
starting point, but our cases present an immense confusion be-
cause in no case has the court seriously attempted a thorough
investigation of the proposition.
There is, however, one position which is accepted by such a
majority of the cases that it can be said to be settled in the con-
sideration of this subject. The cases agree that a counterclaim
is a separate action brought by the defendant against the plain-
tiff and is not merely a defense to the suit instigated by plain-
's Lovejoyv m. Robinson (1856), 8 Ind. 399.
19 Kisler v. Tinder (1868), 29 Ind. 270.
20 Mooney v. Musser (1870), 34 Ind. 373; also Kisler v. Tinder (1868),
29 Ind. 270.
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tiff.21 We may then begin our interpretation of the statute with
the accepted premise that a counterclaim may be considered a
"cause of action" pleaded by the defendant against the plaintiff.
The counterclaim is therefore necessarily subject to the same
rules of pleading as is any other cause of action; that is, it must
state sufficient facts without the interposition of legal conclu-
sions; it must allege matter which has not already been adjudi-
cated; it must assert a right which is not irremediable by reason
of the statute of limitations, ete.22
The purpose of substituting the phrase "cause of action" for
the term "counterclaim" would be useless unless the substituted
phrase is itself capable of definition. In a previous issue of this
Journal, Professor Gavit has considered the various definitions
of the phrase "cause of action.1 23 Consideration of only two of
the divergent views discussed therein is necessary here. Profes-
sor Pomeroy has taken the position that a "cause of action"
consists of a primary right (and its correlative duty) plus the
wrong (the invasion of the right or the violation of the duty).24
Professor Gavit assails this position and points out that such a
definition is inaccurate since in a suit on one of the so-called
primary rights there has been no delict or wrong as yet.25 For
example: P, the owner of real estate, institutes statutory pro-
ceedings to quiet title to his realty as against "the whole world".
In this situation there is only a possibility that D will assert a
claim and it is therefore evident that there has been no inva-
sion of P's primary right, that is, no delict or wrong as yet.
Dean Clark has championed the view that a "cause of action"
consists of the facts involved in the judicial proceeding in ques-
tion.2 6 Taking issue with this view, Professor Gavit points out
that facts alone can never constitute a cause of action but that
the facts must be taken together with a rule of law (substantive)
in order to constitute a cause of action. When the facts pleaded
by a party are taken together with a rule of law not pleaded, they
give to the party a substantive right. The cause of action is
21 Campbell v. Routt (1873), 42 Ind. 410; Douthitt v. Smith (1880), 69
Ind. 463; Rucker v. Steelman (1881), 73 Ind. 396.
22 Woodruff v. Garner (1866), 27 Ind. 4; Hinkle v. Margerum (1875),
50 Ind. 240; Kennedy v. Richardson (1882), 70 Ind. 524.
23 6 Ind. L. Journal 203, et seq. (1931).
24 Pomeroy, Code Remedies (5th Ed. 1929), 528 et seq.
25 6 Ind. Law Journal 219, et seq. (1931).
26 Clark, Handbook of the Law of Code Pleading (1928) 83-85.
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therefore defined by Professor Gavit as substantive right. Right
is used in its broadest sense and is not limited to the classifica-
tion of primary and secondary rights as expounded by Professor
Pomeroy.
The next phrase of the statute which has escaped uniform in-
terpretation and construction is the one containing the words
"arising out of". Professor Gavit points out that when properly
interpreted this phrase would read "coming into being," and
again the thing to be considered as "coming into being" is the
cause of action asserted by facts (matter) plus the operation of
a rule of law. The disjunctive phrase in the statute "or con-
nected with" has also caused some confusion. These same
words are embodied in the statute permitting the joinder of
causes of action and a uniform construction has also been needed
but as yet not forthcoming there.27 The above mentioned article
points out that all the statute requires is a causal connection in
fact, and suggests that the "but for" test be employed. That is,
but for the existence of one fact in the proof of the plaintiff's
asserted cause of action, a fact in the defendant's claim would
not have existed or arisen; the proof of each contains a common
fact. Thus the counterclaim statute would read as follows:
"A counterclaim is a statement of facts which under a rule of law
go to make up (or constitute) a specific substantive right as a matter of
substantive law, and which right came into being partly out of the contract
or factual situation set forth in the complaint as the factual situation of the
plaintiff's substantive right, or which facts stated in the answer have a
causal connection in fact with the factual situation set out in the com-
plaint."28
The forthcoming review of the principal Indiana decisions
will show that this test has never been consciously used by our
courts. But it will also be noted that no test has been adopted
or used by the courts with any consistency and the statement of
a New York judge's estimation of that state's decisions on the
construction of a similar statute is likewise applicable to our
own. He says:
"This statutory provision of law regulating practice, which has been in
force more than sixty years, has frequently been the subject of judicial
construction. Thus far, however, no rule has been laid down in its construc-
tion by which it can readily be decided in all cases whether or not a given
27 Burns' R. S. (1926), Sec. 286-7.
28 6 Ind. Law Journal 314 (1931).
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counterclaim is properly interposed and as might naturally be expected it
would be difficult to harmonize all the decisions on that point."29
It is submitted by the present writer that an adoption of
Professor Gavit's construction would permit every satisfactory
result so far reached, and in addition it would provide and create
simple, workable rules, easy of application and with salubrious
results. The favored interpretation will, while staying within
the grammatical and intended tenor of the statutes, further the
purpose for which they were created, viz., the avoidance of cir-
cuity and multiplicity of actions at law and suits in equity.
The decision in which the court came nearer to applying the
test urged by this article, and which, in the opinion of the pres-
ent writer, represents the best efforts of any court to date in the
interpretation of the statutes, was rendered by the Appellate
Court twenty-five years ago.30  In that case P and D were ad-
joining mine owners. P sued D to recover the price of coal taken
from P's land by the mistake of D as to the location of the boun-
dary between the lands. D alleged that if any coal had been
taken it was through mistake as to the location of the boundary;
that the assignor of P had, in a like manner, taken a like amount
of coal from D's land and D asked that the two claims be made
to compensate each other. After construing D's pleading the
opinion of the court may be paraphrased as follows:
Whether the averments of the counterclaim show that the facts upon
which it is founded arise out of the same transaction set forth in the com-
plaint is the question determining the counterclaim's correctness. The mean-
ing of the word transaction is therefore of controlling importance. The
term transaction as used in the statute is not synonymous with the word
contract or with the term accident or occurrence. A transaction is the man-
agement or settlement of an affair; that which is done; conducting of busi-
ness; negotiation; management; or a proceeding. It is not confined to what
is done in one day or at a single time or place. The logical relation of facts
determines whether they together constitute a single transaction, and the
court is not confined to the facts stated by P but may take into account the
facts set up by D and will determine from them all whether the claims
arise out of the same transaction. P and D were engaged in the transaction
of locating a boundary line. In litigating either claim separately an impor-
tant question, that of location of that boundary, must be investigated. If
that question be decided, then a single additional fact-trespass of the
party-entitles the other party to a recovery. The object of the statute
29 Laughlin, J., in Adams v. Schwarts (1910), 137 App. Div. 230, at 235,
122 N. Y. S. 41.
So Excelsior Clay Works v. DeCamnp (1906), 40 Ind. App. 26.
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was to prevent multiplicity of suits and is hereby upheld. Where the plain-
tiff may elect to sue either in contract or tort and he sues in tort the de-
fendant may interpose a counterclaim as though the plaintiff had sued in
contract. A liberal construction has been given the counterclaim statute
and the counterclaim is held good if it allege matters connected with the
subject of the original action-and even further, where it reaches the
object of the action. A single controversy and full justice to all concerned
are the results and thus the statutory purpose is accomplished.31
The court here was concerned with a logical sequence of facts
and this is the essence of the "but for" test. If we should apply
that rule to the facts in the present case the result would be as
follows: Proof of the proper location of the boundary line is
common to both the plaintiff and the defendant's case; "but for"
that fact neither cause of action could be asserted; therefore the
counterclaim was proper. Such a test reaches the result urged
by the court and reaches it by a far simpler method, which, if
commonly used, would greatly aid the judges in their applica-
tion of the statute.32
In a suit wherein P sued to set aside a conveyance of land a
counterclaim alleging that P wrongfully withholds possession of
the land was held to be good within the meaning of the statute.33
The court seems to base the decision on the grounds that the
fraud alleged by P as the reason for setting aside the deed con-
stitutes the cloud on D's title and that since that cloud is the
aggravation of which D complains the counterclaim states mat-
ter connected with the cause of action within the statutory
definition.
There is a small group of cases wherein the court reached a
rather obviously correct result. It has been held that in an action
on a note given in payment for a lease of land a counterclaim
alleging false representations as to the value of the land is well
pleaded. 34 In another case P sued D for trespass over P's realty
and sought an injunction preventing future trespasses and also
to quiet title to the land in P. By way of counterclaim D alleged
the existence of an easement or public highway over the lots and
sought an injunction preventing P from obstructing such high-
31 The italics are the writer's.
32 It will be noted that the court has difficulty with Pomeroy's definition
of the phrase "cause of action." The defining of a "cause of action" to mean
a substantive right would have solved that difficulty.
33 Grimes v. Duzsa (1869), 32 Ind. 361; also see Gillenwaters v. Camp-
bell (1895), 142 Ind. 529.
34 Norris v. Tharp (1878), 65 Ind. 47.
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way. The court held the counterclaim good since it involved the
same subject and sought affirmative relief which could not be
properly granted upon a successful defense of the complaint.35
The court has sanctioned a counterclaim alleging negligence in
the conduct of litigation to a suit brought to recover attorney's
fees.36 In a suit to foreclose a mechanic's lien D pleaded that the
lien existed by reason of a contract between the parties wherein
P was to construct buildings for D, and that P breached the con-
tract by failing to supply material and workmanship of first
quality. The court held that the pleading alleged such grievances
growing out of the same contract and transactions which were
the basis of the complaint as to constitute a good counterclaim. 38
In a suit wherein P sued D for breach of a contract of em-
ployment D was allowed to plead by way of counterclaim a
breach of an agreement between P and D which was entered
into as a part of the contract set forth in the complaint.39 In
still another case P sued D to obtain a rescission of a deed upon
the ground that the deed was induced by the fraudulent repre-
sentations of D. By counterclaim D pleaded that P wrongfully
kept D from possession and also that P committed waste upon
the premises to D's damage, etc. The court held that,
The alleged fraud is the important question for litigation and if that
question be decided for D, then, a single additional fact being established-
wrongful retention of possession-entitles D to recovery. The object of the
statute is hereby upheld.40
A counterclaim has been allowed which sought an injunction
against P's suit, and which demanded P to make good an injunc-
tion against P's suit, and which demanded P to make good to D
the title to land for which D had executed notes to P, and upon
which notes P brought the present action.41
In an action for damages against bailee for negligently allow-
ing injury to bailor's horse the bailee may plead a counterclaim
setting up an indebtedness due on the bailment.42 In a suit on a
35 DeBolt v. Carter (1869), 31 Ind. 355.
36Rooker v. Bruce (1909), 90 N. E. 86.
38Reichert v. Krass, Surviving partner (1895), 13 ind. App. 348.
39 Blaney v. Postal (1893), 10 Ind. App. 131.
40 Woodruff v. Garner (1866), 27 Ind. 4; see also Kahle v. Crown Oil
Co. (1913), 180 Ind. 131.
41Hinkle v. Margerum (1875), 50 Ind. 240.
42 Grifflv. Moore (1875), 52 Ind. 295; see also Shore v. Ogden (1914),
55 Ind. App. 394.
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contract for work and labor D may set up a counterclaim for
damages resulting from P's failure to conform to the terms of
the contract.43 A claim by the consignee of coal cars for damages
for failure of the railroad company to transport them with
promptness may be pleaded as a counterclaim in an action by the
company for demurrage. 44 A railway company may counter-
claim for damages for breach of contract in an action begun by
another railroad for damages for conversion of P's tracks which
were constructed pursuant to a contract between P and D.45 In
a suit by P against D upon non-negotiable notes executed by D
the latter pleaded that the notes were executed to X in return
for stock to X company, that at the time of the execution of the
said notes X agreed to employ D in X company, that D was em-
ployed for a time and then discharged without notice, and that
this breach of agreement resulted in damages for which D asks
relief. The court held the pleading good as a counterclaim. 46
In all the cases thus far noted the result could be reached
under the relation of fact test presented above. Such a standard
would have afforded the courts a simple rule reaching the de-
sired result in a manner involving little difficulty of explanation
or application.
It is well now to consider those cases where the statutory
purpose has been disregarded by false interpretation. An
alarming number of cases have contained statements that an
independent tort cannot be pleaded in a counterclaim to an ac-
tion in tort. These decisions are undoubtedly the result of a
construction of the phrase "cause of action," as set forth in the
statute, to mean the legal wrong complained of in the complaint.
We have already discussed the fallacy of such a definition and
noted that the cause of action is really the facts plus the opera-
tion of a rule of law which go to make up a substantive right,
and that definition will readily offer a solution to the problem
under consideration.
In an early Indiana case P brought an action for the injury
done to his land by the trespass of D's cattle. D alleged an
injury done to his cattle by P in expelling them from P's land.
The court said that the counterclaim was bad since trespasses
cannot be made to compensate each other by any form of plead-
43 Cumings v. Pence (1890), 1 Ind. App. 317.
44 Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Partlow (1919), 70 Ind. App. 616.
45 Curtis v. Chicago and Eiie Ry. Co. (1918), 68 Ind. App. 370.
46 Indiana Novelty Mfg. Co. v. McGill (1895), 15 Ind. App. 1.
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ing. "The fact that one may be consequent upon the other does
not so connect them as that they may be blended in the same
action since they have no connection with each other, in the
sense of the statute."' 7 If the "but for" test were applied to the
above facts it is obvious that the counterclaim is well pleaded.
But for the trespass of D's cattle P would not have expelled
them. In fact it is difficult to see how the court could say that
such a result was not within the sense of the statute when there
is such an obvious factual relation between the rights asserted
by P and D. The error the court makes in this type of case is
in seeking to find some connection between the legal wrong done
by the plaintiff and the legal wrong done by the defendant. The
test, however, is a factual one.
In another action, wherein P sued D for negligently killing
a cow belonging to P, D averred in a counterclaim that P was
negligent in permitting the cow to wander on D's tracks, and
that by reason thereof, the train struck the cow and the train
was injured; the court held the counterclaim invalid. 48 The
court said that D's negligence was one tort and the negligence
of P was another tort, and that it was well settled that an inde-
pendent tort can not be made a defense against another tort,
either by set-off or counterclaim. Again the "but for" test
would allow the counterclaim. It seems that the result reached
by the court actually flouts the purpose of the statute but it was
followed in a later case involving practically the same facts.49
In an action brought by P for the wrongful conversion of P's
cow by D, the latter pleaded that the cow trespassed on his Iana
and tore down his fence whereby he was injured, etc. The court
held the counterclaim bad since it did not arise out of nor was
it connected with P's cause of action.5 0 The court said in sub-
stance:
We can not see in this case how the trespass of the cow arose out of the
sale and conversion of her by D within the meaning of the statute. We are
unaware of any case where a counterclaim can arise in any action uncon-
nected with a contract.
Again the "but for" test would allow the counterclaim to
stand.
47 Lovejoy v. Robinson (1866), 8 Ind. 399.
4s The Terre Haute and Indianapolis Ry. Co. v. Pierce (1884), 95 Ind.
496.
49 Lake Shore and Mich. Southern Ry. Co. v. Van Auken (1891), 1 Ind.
App. 492.
50 Shelley v. Van Arsdoll (1864), 23 Ind. 543.
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In a later case the court held that in an action for damages
to P's traction engine which was struck by D's interurban car
a counterclaim alleging damages to D's car sustained in the same
collision was not well pleaded.51 It is obvious that there is suf-
ficient causation of fact in this instance to warrant the counter-
claim if the factual relation test is employed. In a still later
case wherein a municipality sued a traction company to recover
damages for injuries to a fire truck resulting from a collision
with traction company's car, it was held that an injury sustained
by defendant's car in the same collision was not a proper subject
of counterclaim.52 The court again talked about the impropriety
of pleading one tort as a counterclaim to a separate tort but the
real reason for the holding was probably the fact that D's plead-
ing did not state a cause of action since it proceeded against the
city.
It is submitted that the statute is to be interpreted the same
in cases wherein a tort is pleaded against a tort, and where a
tort is pleaded to an action on contract. Admitting that the
cases related above form the numerical weight of authority, it
is still contended that they are not supported by convincing rea-
son and logic. However, the courts have held that one trespass
may be pleaded against another if it is shown that a factual
relation exists between the right asserted by the plaintiff and
that asserted by the defendant, and it is obvious that by that
interpretation only can the statutory purpose be accomplished. 53
Our courts have also said that a counterclaim founded in
contract cannot be pleaded to a complaint founded in tort. This
conclusion is also based upon an interpretation of the statutory
phrase "cause of action" to mean the legal wrong complained of
in the complaint and in adopting such a premise it is impossible
to find any relationship between the adverse claims.
Soon after the adoption of the counterclaim statute as a part
of our Code, the following case arose for decision. P sued D to
recover a deposit which D had refused, upon demand, to deliver.
By way of counterclaim D alleged that P falsely charged him
with stealing the money whereby D was damaged.5 4 The court
said in substance,
51 Hooven v. Meyer (1920), 74 Ind. App. 9.
t,2 Union Traction Co. of Indiana v. City of Muncie (1921), 133 N. E.
160.
53 Excelsior Clay Works v. DeCamp (1906), 40 Ind. App. 25.
54 Connor v. Winton (1856), 7 Ind. 523.
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The words "arising out of or connected with" as used in the statute
refer only to those matters having an immediate connection with the trans-
action. If in this case D had beaten P for the slander, P could not
reply with the damages sustained by the battery to those resulting from
the slander. If P's words were so connected with the transaction as to
show that they were spoken concerning the deposit, they contained not a
slander. If they were so unconnected from it as to be actionable they were
an independent tort which could not be pleaded as a counterclaim to an
action founded upon a contract.
It is readily noted that the court required something more than
a factual relationship between the matter set out in the com-
plaint and that set out in the counterclaim. If the causation
standard is applied to the above facts the counterclaim would
be allowed since the demand and refusal and the subsequent
slander were closely fabricated by related facts.
In an action for fraud in falsely representing that certain
letters-patent were of great value and for also falsely represent-
ing that certain assigned territory was of great value, D set up
a counterclaim wherein he alleged that at the time of the assign-
ment of the territory mentioned in the complaint P agreed to
canvass the territory assigned to him and that in violation
thereof he made no effort to canvass the territory and make
sales. 55 The court said that the counterclaim, founded in con-
tract, could not be pleaded to the complaint which sounded in
tort. Again the "but for" test would permit the claims being
adjudicated in one suit.
In another case P sued to foreclose a mortgage executed by
D to secure a loan of money from P. D, by way of counterclaim,
alleged that the loan was obtained from P only after he had
agreed to enter into a contract of insurance with P; that he had
fully complied with all the terms of said contract and was there-
fore entitled to a paid-up policy of insurance which P refused
to recognize. The court disallowed the counterclaim upon the
following grounds:
The evidence shows that the two transactions were legally different
and distinct. Nothing in law or equity binds the transactions together or
authorizes the inference that one grows out of the other. In order to plead
a counterclaim it is not enough that the parties are the same, or that the
transactions were made on the same day. There must be some legal (using
the word legal in its broad sense) relationship between the grounds of re-
covery alleged in the counterclaim and the matters alleged in the cause of
action by the plaintiff.56
56Hess v. Young (1877), 59 Ind. 379.
56 Standley . N. W. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1883), 95 Ind. 254.
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Had the court recognized the position that the relation of
fact alone would satisfy the statutory requirement the counter-
claim would have been allowed and further adjudication elimi-
nated.
In a still later case P sued D upon a note. D alleged that P
had uttered false, malicious and willful statements against D,
alleging that D was insolvent and in this manner prevented D
from obtaining surety for a renewal of the note whereby D was
injured, etc. The court would not allow the counterclaim since
it sounded in tort and could not be the basis of counterclaim
against a contract.57 Although this reasoning has been followed
in other cases,58 it is nevertheless submitted that such a result
is not necessitated by the statutory language and that in fact
such interpretation hinders the purpose for which the statute
was enacted.
The Appellate Court has drawn a distinction between an
action in replevin and other tort actions in order to allow a
counterclaim sounding in contract to be pleaded to an action
based on a tort. In an action wherein P sought to replevin a
horse from D the latter pleaded the following facts in a counter-
claim: P and D entered into a contract whereby D furnished
certain money to P for transporting the horse to various race
tracks and that P agreed to ship the horse to D at the end of
the racing season so that D might have security for his advance-
ments, that P did not reimburse him, and that D had to pay
livery bills in order to obtain the horse as security. D asked
that his lien on the horse be foreclosed so that a sale might be
made thereof in order to repay D.59 The court upheld the coun-
terclaim in substantially the following language:
Replevin is an action sounding in tort but suits in replevin are said to
be in some respects sui generis, and the inclination of the courts has been
to give them a flexibility sufficient to meet exigencies and adjust all equities
arising in such actions. The counterclaim sets up facts so connected with
the subject of the action that equity requires that the matter alleged in the
complaint and in the counterclaim be settled in one litigation.
In a later case wherein P sought to replevin an automobile
left for repairs with D it was held that a counterclaim for the
57 Blue v. Capital National Bank (1896), 145 Ind. 518.
58 Block v. Swango (1894), 10 Ind. App. 600; Crowe v. Kell (1893), 7
Ind. App. 683; Comer v. Board of Commissioners of Morgan County (1904),
32 Ind. App. 477; Cole v. 'Wright (1880), 70 Ind. 179.
59 Reardon v. Higgins, Adr'r (1906), 39 Ind. App. 363.
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cost of the repairs was proper.60 In that case the court distin-
guished the case from an earlier decision which forbade a coun-
terclaim in contract to an action in replevin by the following
language:
"A counterclaim is proper in an action of replevin when the facts set up
therein are so connected with the subject of the action that equity requires
that the matter alleged in the complaint and the counterclaim should all be
settled in the same litigation."
The result reached by these two cases allowing counterclaims
to actions of replevin is both desirable and correct.
It is urged by the present writer, however, that the stated
reason of equity between the parties is the prevention of multi-
plicity of suits, and that if the latter view is entertained the rule
as respecting replevin and other torts would be no different.
But in any event the question always turns on a proper inter-
pretation of the statute in question, and if, a factual connection
makes a counterclaim proper in a contract action it ought to
have the same effect in a tort action. Nothing in the statute
justifies the distinctions which the Indiana courts have made.
Practically every other code state has repudiated them and it is
to be hoped that the Indiana courts will soon clarify the situa-
tion and adopt a clear-cut interpretation of the statute which
will promote the ends for which the statute was adopted.
Having once confirmed the validity of the pleading as a
counterclaim, our courts have had little difficulty with the device.
The counterclaim is considered as a cross-action and the rules
governing the complaint are applied to the counterclaim as if it
were the original action. Thus if the complaint be dismissed
the right to proceed with a trial of the counterclaim is recog-
nized. 61 If the jury find an excess for D over the amount proven
by P, then D shall have judgment for the excess.62 Likewise
the counterclaim need not be sufficient against the whole com-
plaint. If it tends to reduce the plaintiff's claim or demand for
damages, it is good as far as it goes.6 3 The law of misjoinder
of causes of action applies to counterclaim just as it does to any
60 Shore v. Ogden (1914), 55 Ind. App. 394, 103 N. E. 852.
61 Tabor v. Mackkee (1877), 58 Ind. 290; Burns' R. S. (1926), Se. 376.
62 Gordon v. George (1859), 12 Ind. 408; Love v. Oldham (1866), 22
Ind. 51.
63
.Sideer v. Davis (1879), 69 Ind. 336; Campbell v. Routt (1873), 42
Ind. 410.
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other cause of action.64 It has also been held that a counter-
claim may be replied to a counterclaim set up in an answer.65
The above examples point out the ease with which the courts
may deal with the counterclaim once it has received the court's
approval as being within the statutory definition. The coun-
terclaim is a very convenient and useful means in relieving the
congestion which is prevalent in our courts today. It is sub-
mitted that the definition of the counterclaim as sponsored by
this review will allow its application to a much more extensive
field but nevertheless stay within the intention of the codifiers
and further the purpose which motivated its inception. The
lack of a uniform rule is readily noticeable by this discussion of
the cases and although the authority sanctioning the causal re-
lation tests as urged by this article is slight, an adoption by our
courts of that standard will best serve the purpose for which the
counterclaim was devised. The resulting uniformity would be
based on simple rules, easy of application, and reaching desir-
able conclusions, and at the same time in keeping with the au-
thority of some of the Indiana cases.
II
THE SET-OFF
The set-off is of statutory origin and all questions concern-
ing its availability and effect should be gathered from an inter-
pretation of the legislative enactment which created it. That
section of our Civil Code which is concerned with the contents
of an answer to the plaintiff's complaint contains this statement:
"The defendant may set forth in his answer as many grounds of de-
fense, counterclaim and set-off, whether legal or equitable, as he shall
have."66
Although this provision comes under the heading of the an-
swer it is evident from the tenor of the statement, when read
with the inflection which the punctuation therein requires, that
the set-off is not a defense and therefore not strictly an answer
to the complaint of the plaintiff. The courts have taken cogni-
zance of this distinction and have held, practically without ex-
64 Woodruff v. Garner (1866), 27 Ind. 4.
65 Smwll v. Kennedy (1893), 137 Ind. 299.
66 Burns' R. S. (1926), Sec. 370, subsec. 3.
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ception, that the set-off is not a defense to the original action
but a statement of a new cause of action existing in favor of
the defendant against the plaintiff.67 Since the set-off is cor-
rectly viewed as a separate cause of action it is necessarily gov-
erned by the laws of pleading which limit and define the manner
of asserting a cause of action.68 The set-off statute begins:
"A set-off shall be allowed only in actions for money-demands upon
contract .. 69
This portion of the statute is free from any ambiguity and
the courts have had little difficulty with its application and inter-
pretation. The action brought by plaintiff must be a contract
action and a set-off is never allowed to an action sounding in
tort.70 If the original complaint contains more than one para-
graph and one of these paragraphs sound in tort and another in
contract the set-off cannot be pleaded to the whole complaint but
must be directed to the paragraph sounding in contract.71 Al-
though the question apparently has never arisen, it seems doubt-
ful that the language employed by the codifiers that a set-off
could be pleaded to a suit to compel specific performance of a
contract. In view of the fact that the vendor does secure a find-
ing that a sum of money is due, it would seem to come within
the purpose of the statute to allow a reduction of that amount
by a proper set-off.
Continuing with the examination of the statute it is noted
that the set-off must consist of matter "arising out of debt, duty,
or contract. . . ." This phrase of the enactment is not so
commendable from the standpoint of clarity as is the next pre-
ceding clause already discussed. The term "contract" is self-
explanatory but the disjunctive words "debt" and "duty" re-
67 Boil v. Sims (1877), 60 Ind. 162; Kennedy v. Richardson (1880), 70
Ind. 524; Duffy v. England (1911), 176 Ind. 575. Since the court does not
regard the set-off as a defense it is not subject to the rule as to partial
defenses and it need not answer the whole demand of plaintiff. Dodge v.
Dunham (1872), 41 Ind. 186.
68 Stockton v. Graves (1858), 10 Ind. 294; Morrison v. Gliddon (1856),
7 Ind. 561; Brake v. King (1876), 54 Ind. 294; Snodgrass v. Smith (1859),
13 Ind. 393.
69 Burns' R. S. (1926), Sec. 371.
70 Grose v. Dickerson (1876), 53 Ind. 460; Boil v. Sims (1877), 60 Ind.
162; Van Cleave v. Beach (1886), 110 Ind. 269.
71 Howlitt v. Dilts (1881), 4 Ind. App. 23; Ross v. Faust (1876), 54 Ind.
471; Allen v. Randolph (1874), 48 Ind. 496.
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quire judicial interpretation. It is sufficient for the present
purpose to point out that the courts have, for the most part,
decided that the term contract was intended to modify the two
preceding terms so as to read-contract debt and contract duty.72
In all of the cases cited the court has denied the right to inter-
pose a tort claim as a set-off by interpreting the statute to mean
contract duty or contract debt. The court has also said that in
cases where the defendant has such a tort claim as he may
waive and sue in an independent action for the value of the con-
verted property such a waiver does not bring the action under
the provision of the statute allowing set-off.73
The statute provides that the claim interposed by the de-
fendant as a set-off may be liquidated or not. An early Indiana
case refused to allow a set-off alleging negligence in the collec-
tion of notes. The court held:
The claim against plaintiff was one of tort for negligence and sounds
in unliquidated damages. Such a claim is not a proper subject of set-off.74
A later case presented the following facts: P sued D on a
promissory note executed by D. D alleged that P had maliciously
procured the prosecution of a civil action against D which was
still pending. After construing the pleading of D as a set-off
the court disallowed it and used the following language:
The general rule is that unliquidated damages can not be pleaded by
way of set-off, and nothing in this case takes it out of that general rule.75
It is obvious that the set-off is bad for the reason that it
attempts to set up a tort as a set-off and also that it attempts
to assert a claim which has not matured. Despite the court's
reference to their holding as reflecting the general rule, all the
other cases have held that the matter in the set-off need not be
liquidated.76 It is submitted that these latter cases, in addition
to comprising the indisputable weight, evidence the express in-
tent of the statute and must be considered as overruling the
two contrary cases. The latter cases could both have been de-
72 1ndianapolis and C. R. Co. v. Ballard (1864), 22 Ind. 448; Roback v.
Powell (1871), 36 Ind. 515; Zeigelmueller v. Seamer (1878), 63 Ind. 488;
Avery v. Dougherty (1885), 102 Ind. 294.
73Richey v. Bly (1888), 115 Ind. 232.
74Abbott v. Smith (1853), 4 Ind. 452.
75 West v. Hayes (1885), 104 Ind. 251.
76 Hendry v. Hendry (1869), 32 Ind. 349; Irish v. Snelson (1861), 16
Ind. 365; Bannister v. Jett (1882), 83 Ind. 129; Stockton v. Graves (1858),
10 Ind. 294.
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cided on other grounds which are in accordance with the general
rule.
The set-off statute further provides that the claim asserted
by the defendant must be held by him at the time the suit was
commenced, and matured at or before the time it is offered as a
set-off. Again the statute is practically free from doubt as to
its purport. The claim asserted as a set-off must be held at the
time the suit against which it is pleaded was filed.77 It is not
necessary that the claim which is pleaded as a set-off be matured
at the time but it must be matured at the time it is offered as a
set-off.7 8 The court has held that a judgment upon which there
had been a stay of execution is not immature within the mean-
ing of the statute since the stay of execution simply delayed its
collection.79
Our Procedural Code provides that in all actions upon a note
or other contract against several defendants, any one of whom
is principal and the others sureties therein, any claim upon con-
tract in favor of the principal defendant, and against the plain-
tiff or any former holder of the note or other contract, may be
pleaded as a set-off by the principal or any other defendant.8 0
The effect of that statute is illustrated by the following case.
P sues D on a note executed by D and his sureties. Any of the
sureties or D himself may plead as a set-off a contract executed
by P to D.81 In suits against two defendants, the defendant
filing the set-off should allege that he is the principal and the
other makers of the note in suit are only sureties.8 2
A set-off will never be allowed when it is shown that to
allow it a property, which the Constitution or a statute declares
shall be held by the debtor for the benefit of his family, would
be destroyed. Thus, if the defendant's property, including his
judgment against plaintiff, does not exceed the amount awarded
exemption by statute, the court will not allow the plaintiff to
set-off a judgment held against defendant to the judgment held
77 Weader v. First National Bank of Crawfordsville (1890), 126 Ind.
111; Hadley v. Wray (1881), 76 Ind. 476; Blount v. Rick (1886), 107 Ind.
238.
78 Shannon v. Wilson (1862), 19 Ind. 112; Thornton v. Williams (1860),
14 Ind. 518.
79 Hays v. Boyer (1877), 59 Ind. 341.
80 Burns' R. S. (1926), Sec. 372.
81 Myers u. State ex rel Appleton (1873), 45 Ind. 160; Hoffman v. Zol-
linger (1872), 39 Ind. 461.
82 Dodge v. Dunham (1872), 41 Ind. 186; Harris v. Rivers (1876), 53
Ind. 216.
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against plaintiff by defendant.8 3 If P sues D on a note and D
pleads as set-off a note executed by P to D, the court will not
permit the set-off if P proves an exemption.8 4
An Indiana statute provides that all actions by assignees
shall be without prejudice to any set-off or other defense exist-
ing at the time of or before notice of the assignment, except
actions on negotiable promissory notes and bills of exchange,
transferred in good faith and upon good consideration before
due.8 5
The purpose of the statute is illustrated by the following
example. D executes his non-negotiable note to X. Subsequently
D becomes the owner of non-negotiable notes executed by X and
later hears of the assignment of the note he executed to X to P.
In an action by P on the note executed by D to X, D may set-off
the notes held by him which were executed by X. Our courts
have assigned this rather obvious meaning to the statute.88 The
defendant may set-off to an action brought by plaintiff any con-
tract or note executed by plaintiff to another and assign to D
before the suit by plaintiff is commenced.8 7 In such cases the
claim which is proffered as a set-off must have been uncondi-
tionally assigned to defendant and not a mere assignment for
collection.88
It is provided by statute that if a set-off established at the
trial exceeds the plaintiff's claim so established, judgment shall
be rendered for the excess; or if it appears that the defendant
is entitled to other affirmative relief, judgment shall be given
therefor.8 9 Although there have been no cases which have ap-
plied this statute it is probably because the circumstances have
not required its application. The fact that the courts accept the
statute at its face value has more than once been reflected in the
dicta of opinions. 90
83 Carpenter v. Cool (1888), 115 Ind. 134; Butner v. Bowser (1885),
104 Ind. 255.
84 Smit7 v. Sills (1890), 126 Ind. 205; Coffing v. Dungan (1892), 6 Ind.
App. 386; Junker v. Hustes (1887), 113 Ind. 524.
85 Burns' R. S. (1926), Sec. 283.
86 Hoffman v. Zollinger (1872), 39 Ind. 461; Sefton v. Hargett (1888),
113 Ind. 592.
87Bates v. Prickett (1854), 5 Ind. 22; Hadley v. Wray (1881), 76 Ind.
476.
88 Lewis v. Sheaman (1867), 28 Ind. 427; Claflin v. Dawson (1877), 58
Ind. 408.
89 Burns' R. S. (1926), Sec. 622.
9O0 Doering v. Davenport (1910), 91 N. E. 43; Crain v. Hilgross (1863),
21 Ind. 210; Holeraft v. Mellott (1877), 57 Ind. 539.
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It has been held that if a set-off is pleaded and then the
pleader has suffered default, the rights to such set-off are
waived. 91 The reason advanced for this rule was that the de-
fendant who was asserting the set-off might have taken a rule
upon the plaintiff to rely to his answer, and on failure to com-
ply with the rule, judgment might have been taken for want of
a reply.
It is well settled that as a general rule a set-off is not allow-
able unless the demands are mutual.9 2 It is unnecessary for the
purpose of this review to consider the doctrine of mutuality at
length since the principle is universally accepted. The rule may
be briefly stated as follows: matter of set-off, to be valid, must
be between the same parties as the matter alleged in the com-
plaint.93 A defendant, in a suit against him for debt, cannot
set off a debt due to him and another; the demands not being
mutual.94 Likewise, a claim against a guardian individually
cannot be used as a set-off against an action by him as a guard-
ian.95 These illustrations represent the theory of the doctrine
of mutuality and a further discussion would be more pedantic
than useful. It is to be noted that the principle of mutuality
may be abrogated by statute and the statute which allows a
surety to assert a claim held by his principal against the plain-
tiff as a set-off to an action brought by plaintiff against the prin-
cipal and surety illustrates that abrogation. 96
III.
EQUrrABL SET-OFF.
In addition to the exceptions to the rule requiring that the
matter of set-off, to be valid, must be between the same parties
as the matter alleged in the complaint, the courts, in order to
prevent irremediable injustice, have allowed set-offs between liti-
gants, though wholly disconnected and wanting in mutuality.
91Aston. v. Wallace (1873), 43 Ind. 468.
92 Blankenship v. Rogers (1858), 10 Ind. 333; First National Bank of
Danville u. Hill (1877), 58 Ind. 52; Knour v. Dic (1860), 14 Ind. 20;
Kent v. Cantrall (1873), 44 Ind. 452.
93 First National Bank of Danville v. Hill (1877), 58 Ind. 52.
94 Parks r. Zeeks (1876), 53 Ind. 221; Proctor 'v. Cole (1889), 120 Ind.
102.
95 Robertson v. Garshwiler (1882), 81 Ind. 463.
96 Burns' R. S. (1926), Sec. 372; see also note 85, this article.
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The following cases are examples of that policy. D owed P $249
for goods sold and delivered. S, a servant of D, owed P $432. S
wrongfully converted $195 of D's money and paid the same to
P. P, a resident of New York sues D, resident of Indiana, in this
state on D's indebtedness. D attempts set off. The court held
that set-off was allowed on the grounds that the nonresidence of
P justified the interposition of equity in order to prevent an irre-
mediable injustice.97
In another case, P sued D and X on a note made by D. P al-
leged that D, being insolvent, had assigned his notes to X for
the purposes of defrauding creditors. Among the assigned notes
was a note of P to D. P asks that the assignment be declared
fraudulent and that the amount of his note to D be set off against
the one sued upon. The court allowed the set-off.98 In a previous
trial of the same cause which occurred before P's note to D was
matured, the court refused the set-off since P did not prove the
insolvency of D.99 In still another instance the court allowed an
equitable set-off. P sued D on notes executed by D to X and as-
signed by X after maturity and while X was insolvent. D was
allowed to set-off payment made on a note which was executed by
X and which D had made payments as surety.'
Other cases have tried to invoke the equitable set-off but the
courts require the pleadings and proof to bring the case under
the recognized exceptions of insolvency or non-residence. 2 Al-
though the result of the cases allowing equitable set-offs is desir-
able the doctrine is a delicate one and will probably be limited
to the exceptions already recognized.
It is to- be noted that the equitable set-off is not limited by
statutory definition but is a product of the courts granting an
equity which prevents the working of an irremediable injustice.
Any limitations, modifications, or any extension of the equitable
set-off will rest on the exercise of the court's discretion and not
upon statutory interpretation.
97 Porter v. Roseman (1906), 165 Ind. 255.
98 Keightly v. Walls (1866), 27 Ind. 384.
99 Keighiy v. Walls (1865), 24 Ind. 205.
1 Eigenman v. Clark (1898), 21 Ind. App. 129.
2 Rush v. Thompson (1887), 112 Ind. 158;-Spinney v. Hall (1912), 49
Ind. App. 502.
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